A different kind of second-order desire?
- Posted by Paul Gowder on August 1st, 2009 filed in philosophy
- 7 Comments »
Conventionally, we recognize that we can desire that Q, and have a second-order desire that we not desire that Q (or that we continue to desire that Q, but that’s less interesting). But it seems to me that there are other sorts of second-order desires when Q is something that we can bring about by intentional action.
For example, let Q be “I eat the ice cream.” I might desire that Q, and not(desire that I not desire that Q)*, yet still desire that it not be brought about that I eat the ice cream. This seems like a straightforward inconsistency — like this new kind of second-order desire is just the negation of my first order desire (I desire that I eat the ice cream, but I also desire that I don’t eat the ice cream? what?). But it seems like there might be more to it than that. The object of the first-order desire seems to be a state of affairs — the me-eating-the-ice-cream state of affairs** — but the object of the second-order desire is an action — my forming and carrying out the intention to actually eat the damned ice cream. And I might reject the intention even as I endorse the action underneath it…? I desire to be-eating (non-intentionally) the ice cream, but don’t desire to eat (intentionally) the ice cream.
Understood differently, isn’t it possible to have a weakness (e.g., for ice cream), to endorse having that weakness (to approve of being the sort of person who has really excellent taste in ice cream and goes for the good things in life, say), and yet to want to resist actually giving in to the weakness?
Hmm… Richard, are you reading?
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* I might take a neutral attitude with respect to my ice-cream eating desire, or I may actively endorse it.
** The state of affairs in which I am carrying out the physical act, that is.
August 1st, 2009 at 3:06 pm
I’m not sure I follow this. It’s certainly possible to want some state of affairs to result, but not to be the person who intentionally causes this result. (You could hope to unintentionally brush hands with your date, for example. Or you could want someone else to bring about the end result.) But aren’t those just different first-order desires?
Here’s a simple consistency test: can you describe the possible world where all your desires are fulfilled? It’s possible to have a desire for icecream but to resist acting on it. Is that combination what you want? Or do you also want to be the sort of person that acts on the desire for icecream, at the same time as never so acting? That sounds less coherent to me.
August 1st, 2009 at 3:56 pm
I might desire that Q, and not(desire that I not desire that Q)*, yet still desire that it not be brought about that I eat the ice cream.
Why do you think this? I mean, if this doesn’t come down to two conflicting desires (I desire that Q, and that not Q), the only sense I can give to the last desire, that “it not be brought about …”, is something like, “I desire that I eat the ice cream, dammit—not that you stuff it down my mouth”. Which is perfectly sensible, and not problematic at all.
August 1st, 2009 at 5:24 pm
Desire sets like I’m thinking about can’t be satisfied in any non-ridiculous possible world (excluding, for example, worlds in which I unintentionally eat the ice cream because I think it’s mashed potatoes). But neither can ordinary desire sets with second-order desires not to have the first-order desire, i.e. once we exclude worlds where, for example, I eat the ice cream even though I no longer want to. My intuition is that the desiring-not-to-intentionally-Q sort of second-order desire is only inconsistent with the first order desire in that weak sense that is shared by many ordinary second-order desires, rather than the stronger sense of inconsistency that comes from desiring Q and desiring not-Q.
Perhaps this will be clearer if I say more about the sort of thought process I’m imagining. I might wish I were someone who could better resist bad desires, but, at the same time, not wish to tamper with my personality by removing those desires. (The person who doesn’t want be eating the ice cream just wouldn’t be me.)
Maybe this desire to be able to resist the desire that Q entails a desire that not-Q (to motivate the resistance). But wouldn’t that be the case for conventional second-order desires too? Also, that seems non-obvious, if only because the experience of wishing one has more willpower and the experience of struggling, Hamlet-like, with two conflicting desires seem very different.
August 1st, 2009 at 7:11 pm
You are talking about conflicting first order desires. You want to eat ice cream. You want to not be fat(ter). Which do you want more? That is the only question.
August 1st, 2009 at 8:25 pm
Wanting to be the kind of person who would not want Q is not the same as wanting not to want Q directly!
August 7th, 2009 at 2:04 am
So, you want to be the kind of person who craves ice-cream but does not act on the craving.
So basically, you have 3 desires.
1. icecream
2. not act on craving
3. 1 and 2
It seems to me that 1 and 2 are 1st order desires.
While 3 is a second order desire that simply affirms your 1st order desires.
2 would have to be first order as it would be directly about a particular action and not about the desire for icecream.
3 could be split up separately, but it seems that I am losing something if I treat them separately. You dont just desire to like icecream and also happen to desire to not act on that first desire, you desire that both desires together in ways that changing your first order desires would frustrate your second order desire to a greater degree than your secind order desires wold have been frustrated if the second order desires had been separate.
I’m not exactly sure there is a contradiction though.
After all, we can have conflicting first order desires.
August 17th, 2009 at 8:13 am
[...] Gowder, of Uncommon Priors, has pointed out some complexities involved in the human psychology of desire, particularly second-order desire. [...]